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GRANT SUPPORT AND EXPORTING ACTIVITY
Holger Go¨rg, Michael Henry, and Eric Strobl*
Abstract—This paper investigates whether government support can act to
increase exporting activity. We use a uniquely rich data set on Irish
manufacturing plants and employ an empirical strategy that combines a
nonparametric matching procedure with a difference-in-differences esti-
mator in order to deal with the potential selection problem inherent in the
analysis. Our results suggest that if grants are large enough, they can
encourage already exporting firms to compete more effectively on the
international market. However, there is little evidence that grants encour-
age nonexporters to start exporting.
I. Introduction
MOST governments seem to take a positive view on exporting, sothat the more firms in the economy that export, the better. In this
regard it is not surprising that many governments have taken some
initiative in encouraging firms to export. Despite the potential impor-
tance of using explicit policies to promote exporting activity, there
are, however, few empirical studies that have investigated this issue.
One exception is the recent study by Bernard and Jensen (2004) on the
determinants of exporting activity in the United States which, among
other things, investigates whether export promotion expenditures at
the state level influence the decision of U.S. plants to export. Their
findings suggest little evidence that such policies encourage partici-
pation in the global market by U.S. manufacturers.
Arguably, export promotion expenditures on their own may not
have a significant effect on exporting. Firstly, expenditure on
export promotion measured at the state level may be masking
firm-specific differences in their ability to access information on
foreign markets and, hence, heterogeneity in the ability to export.
Secondly, information on foreign markets per se may not be
sufficient to ensure that firms can successfully compete on the
international markets. Even more important may be that firms are
productive enough to do so. As the recent theoretical and empirical
literature on firm-level export activity argues, selling abroad in-
volves sunk costs, and it is only the “better” firms, that is, those
that are more efficient or productive, that are able to overcome
these entry barriers and export successfully (Clerides, Lach, &
Tybout, 1998; Bernard & Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003). These
findings perhaps highlight the fact that other types of government
support specifically targeted at improving productivity-related as-
pects of the firms’ operations, to assist them in overcoming barriers
to exporting, could prove more effective. Examples of such rele-
vant support programs arguably include subsidies, such as for
R&D and training, among others.1 However, to date there has been,
as far as we are aware, no study that has explicitly investigated this
indirect channel of government subsidies.
In this paper we explicitly investigate whether firm-specific subsi-
dies of all types can play a role in encouraging export activity. More
specifically, we take advantage of the case of manufacturing industries
in the Republic of Ireland where an extensive and diverse grant
support system has been used in an attempt to make indigenous
industry more internationally competitive. In this regard we have
access to plant-level data including, among many other things, the
total amount of output exported and an exhaustive database containing
information on all grants provided by Irish authorities. It is important
to note that these grants are not specifically designed to promote
exporting but are related to encouraging investment in technology,
training, or physical capital.
A crucial issue in estimating how government support may affect
firm exporting activity is how to deal with the problem of what it
would have been without government support. Ideally, the researcher
would want to observe what would have happened to exporting
activity in the firm if it had not received a subsidy. Clearly, however,
this is unobservable; one can only witness a funded firm’s actual
exports and not what it would have sold abroad without a subsidy.
This leaves as a control group only those firms that were not subsi-
dized. The use of nonrecipients as a comparison group, however,
would only be justified if the provision of grants were a completely
random process, otherwise the analysis would suffer from selection
bias. In reality, of course, this is unlikely to be the case as authorities
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will select recipients among the pool of candidates according to some
selection criteria.2
Thus, properly identifying the effects of public funding on export-
ing activity requires generating the appropriate counterfactual in order
to deal with the possible selection bias. A number of econometric
approaches have been applied to deal with this issue, including
instrumental variables techniques, selection models, difference-in-
differences estimators, or propensity-score matching. In their survey
of the various estimation methods that can be used for this type of
evaluation in nonexperimental data, Blundell and Costa Dias (2000)
conclude that a combination of the nonparametric propensity-score
matching with the difference-in-differences estimator is likely to
considerably improve the accuracy of an evaluation study. This is the
technique we employ in this paper to investigate the impact of
subsidies on plants’ export performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the follow-
ing section we outline grant provision in Ireland. Section III describes
our data set and provides some preliminary empirical analysis. We
outline the matching procedure combined with the difference-in-
difference estimator in section IV. Section V contains our main results,
and we provide a summary and some concluding comments in the
final section.
II. Grant Provision in Ireland3
Industrial policy has arguably been an important component of the
evolution of Irish manufacturing. Originally based on more traditional
activities, Irish manufacturing has evolved to become a highly mod-
ernized, technologically intensive sector that is an important part of
the Irish economy. More generally, the approach taken by industrial
policymakers in trying to modernize Irish manufacturing has been
two-pronged—on the one hand encouraging foreign multinationals to
locate in Ireland, while at the same time encouraging indigenous
industry to develop. While employment creation was perhaps the
more short-term goal toward which Irish policymakers were geared,
the ultimate goal was to make indigenous Irish industry internation-
ally competitive and to contribute to enhanced economic growth.
The agency primarily responsible for the provision of grant assis-
tance in manufacturing in the modern era has been the Industrial
Development Agency (IDA) until 1994, after which it was split into
IDA Ireland and Forbairt. The former is now responsible for the grant
provision to foreign-owned firms, while the latter presides over
assisting indigenous plants.4 The types of grants that have been
available to firms include capital grants, training grants, R&D grants,
rent subsidies, employment grants, feasibility study grants, technology
acquisition grants, loan guarantees and interest subsidies.
While there have been some changes in the provision of grants over
time, provision within the time period examined in our empirical
analysis can be safely summarized as follows (see KPMG, 2003):
projects suitable for assistance had to either involve the production of
goods primarily for export; be of an advanced technological nature for
supply to international trading or skilled self-supply firms within
Ireland; and/or be in sectors of the Irish market that are subject to
international competition. To be eligible, the applicant generally has to
show that the project requires financial assistance; is viable; has an
adequate equity capital base; and, through financial assistance, will be
able to generate new employment or maintain existing employment in
Ireland, thereby increasing output and value added within the Irish
economy. Additionally, there is also a generally more favorable view
of projects that are more technology intensive and of a more entre-
preneurial nature. The actual grant level is generally very project
specific and subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, total grant
levels can generally not exceed certain capital cost thresholds, usually
between 45% and 60%. Grants are usually paid in prespecified
installments such that further payment is often subject to periodic
reviews.
III. Data and Preliminary Empirics
A. Data
We utilize information from a number of data sources collected by
Forfa´s, the policy and advisory board with responsibility for enter-
prise, trade, science, and technology in Ireland. Our first data source
is the Irish Economy Expenditure (IEE) survey, collected from 1983
until 1998, which then became the Annual Business Survey (ABS)
and to which we have access until 2002. This is an annual survey of
Irish manufacturing plants with at least twenty employees, although a
plant, once included, is generally still surveyed even if its employment
level falls below this cutoff point.5 The data available from this source
that are relevant to the current paper are the level of output and
exports, employment, wages, both total and domestically purchased
inputs, nationality of ownership, and sector of production.6
One should note that Forfa´s defines foreign plants as plants that are
majority owned by foreign shareholders, that is, where there is at least
50% foreign ownership. While, arguably, plants with a lower percent-
age of foreign ownership should still possibly be considered foreign
owned, this is not necessarily a problem for the case of Ireland since
almost all inward foreign direct investment has been greenfield
investment rather than acquisition of local firms (see Barry & Bradley,
1997). Since foreign multinationals in Irish manufacturing used Ire-
land primarily as an export base, we only use data on indigenous
plants in our subsequent analysis.
We also used data from the Forfa´s’s R&D surveys undertaken in
1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997, and the innovation
surveys 1990/1992 and 1994/1996, which provide information with
regard to plants’ R&D activity. These surveys are largely considered
to be close to exhaustive of R&D undertaken by large plants in Irish
manufacturing, such as those covered by the IEE, during the surveyed
years. This information can be linked to the IEE via a unique plant
identifier maintained by Forfa´s. Additionally, the ABS collected in-
formation on whether a plant incurred any R&D expenditures, which
provides us with information on R&D activity of plants after 1998. We
use these data sources to create a zero-one indicator of whether a plant
2 Moreover, awareness of these criteria may mean that plants will
self-select themselves into the application process.
3 See Meyler and Strobl (2000) for a more detailed discussion.
4 After 1998 Forbairt become Enterprise Ireland as a consequence of a
merger with the Irish Trade Board.
5 To be precise, in the ABS (since 1999) the official threshold cutoff
point was plants with at least ten employees. However, by 1998 there were
a considerable number of plants in the IEE with fewer than twenty
employees, and we thus did not drop these from either of the two sources.
One should note that we did experiment with excluding observations from
both that fell below twenty, but this made essentially no qualitative and
quantitative difference in our results.
6 All nominal variables are appropriately deflated by the consumer price
index as there are no official sector-level price deflators available to us.
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has any R&D expenditure in the years for which the information on
R&D activity was available.7
We use the R&D variable as a proxy for whether a plant developed
any new products. Bernard and Jensen (2004) show that U.S. plants
switching into new products are significantly more likely to export
than others. Their definition of a new product is based on firms’
switching from one four-digit industry to another. Our argument is
that R&D activity is a reasonable proxy for new products as it allows
plants to diversify their goods. In this way, R&D activity could
capture the introduction of new products both that involved industry
changes and that did not. In contrast, using industry changes as a
proxy for new products only captures the introduction of new goods
that involved changes in industry of the main product of the firm.8
It is important of course to verify that R&D activity is indeed
correlated with new product generation. In this regard some of the
R&D surveys asked whether the R&D expenditure was used to
develop new products.9 The surveys indicate that nearly 93% of plants
spent at least some of their R&D expenditure to develop new prod-
ucts. Of those that spent some positive money on R&D, on average
54% of the expenditure was for the development of new products. It
thus seems reasonable to assume that R&D activity is at least strongly
correlated with the introduction of new products.
Importantly for the question to be addressed in this paper, Forfa´s
also has an exhaustive annual database on all grant payments that have
been made to plants in Irish manufacturing since 1972. Again a unique
numerical identifier allows us to link the grant information with the
variables derived from the IEE, ABS, R&D, and innovation surveys.
One should note that by linking information across data sources, our
sample consists of plants of generally at least twenty employees for
the years 1986–2002.10
B. Preliminary Empirics
In figure 1, we graph total exports and grant payments received by
the plants in our sample for the years 1983–2002. As can be seen, both
variables have on average increased substantially over the time period
considered. Moreover, they seem to move in conjunction with each
other. In fact, the raw correlation coefficient is 0.82 and statistically
significant.
We also provide some summary statistics in table 1. In line with
previous evidence for Ireland (for example, Ruane & Sutherland,
2005), we find that exporters are, on average, larger (in terms of
employment) than plants that produce only for the domestic market.
They also pay higher wages, import a larger share of their inputs from
abroad, and have greater R&D incidence. Most importantly, the
summary statistics show that exporters receive per unit of output
nearly twice as much grant support.
IV. Econometric Methodology
The major problem in evaluating the effect of government grants
on exporting is that grant receipt is most likely not random. Rather,
certain types of firms may self-select into the application process and
the government may consciously select certain types of recipients
among the applicants. As stated earlier, Blundell and Costa Dias
(2000) argue that a combination of matching and difference-in-
differences analysis may be a particularly suitable approach in an
evaluation study such as ours and we thus follow this approach here.
Traditionally the evaluation approach has been applied to single-
treatment frameworks. Arguably in the case of the effect of grant
provision on exporting activity, however, it is not only whether a plant
receives a grant but how much it receives that may matter. Fortunately
the evaluation approach has recently also been extended to multiple-
treatment cases (see Imbens, 2000, and Lechner, 2001), and we utilize
this extension to allow us to investigate how different grant amounts
have affected exporting activity.
In this regard let there be K1 different states, where these consist
of K prespecified categories of mutually exclusive grant amounts and
the case of no grant receipt (k  0). If we denote exporting by Y, then
the number of potential outcomes associated with each state for each
plant i is Y i0, Y i1, . . . ,Y iK. Letting Ti  k, where T  {0, 1, . . . K}, be
the actual occurrence of the state of plant i, then all other elements in
T are not observed for that plant.
One can use this framework to define the “effect of treatment on the
treated.” More precisely, for (K  1) K pairwise comparisons of the
average effect of grant amount type k relative to grant amount type k
conditional on receipt of grant amount type k, the effect of treatment
on the treated is
EY k Y kT k EY kT k
 EY kT k for k, k 0, 1, . . . K, k k.
(1)
One should note that while the first term is observed in the data, none
of the other pairwise combinations are. In the evaluation literature,
one common estimator of these other counterfactuals is
EYkT k EXEYkT k, XT k (2)
7 Unfortunately not all surveys have information on the actual expendi-
ture figures.
8 Unfortunately Forfa´s does not keep track of industry changes of plants;
rather, plants remain classified by industry as they are first tracked in the
data. However, the view of Forfa´s is that in Ireland very few plants would
change industries in terms of their main products. Part of the reason for
this may be that because of the structural changes in Irish manufacturing
since E.U. entry in 1973, most new plants were entering industries
relatively new to Ireland.
9 This question was posed in the 1986, 1990, 1991, 1995, and 1997
surveys.
10 Obviously years during this sample period where there was missing
information from the R&D and innovation surveys had to be dropped.
Since we used this information as lagged controls in our matching, this
meant dropping observations for the years 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1999.
FIGURE 1.—TRENDS IN EXPORTS AND GRANT PAYMENTS
Notes: Both series are in 2002 prices and millions of euros.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS170
for some set of observable characteristics X. There are two impor-
tant aspects to note with regard to equation (2). First, in order for
the inner expectation of equation (2) to hold, one needs to invoke
what is commonly known in the literature as the conditional
independence assumption, which requires that conditional on the
value of the set of observable characteristics X, which themselves
need to be unaffected by the treatment, the treatment indicator T is
independent of all potential outcomes. Second, in order to evaluate
the outer expectation, it is pertinent that all participants in k have
a counterpart in the k comparison group for each X for which one
seeks to make a comparison. In other words, one needs to find a
“common support” region.
The propensity-score matching (PSM) estimator specifically ad-
dresses the potential problem of common support. More precisely, the
PSM estimator can help eliminate the bias due to differences in the
supports of X in the treated and nontreated groups and the bias due to
differences in the two groups in the distribution of X over its common
support by “matching” similar individuals across these two groups. In
terms of implementing this estimator, one normally would like to
match individual units across a number of observable characteristics.
However, in this regard it would be difficult to determine along which
dimension to match the plants, or what type of weighting scheme to
use. To overcome this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) suggest the use of a propensity score generated from modeling
the probability of the treatment, and this method can be easily
extended within a multiple treatment framework of pairwise compar-
isons. One should note in this regard that Lechner (2001) pointed out
that when comparing two “treatment groups,” the existence of mul-
tiple treatments can be ignored since these other individuals are not
needed for identification.
Accordingly, we first identify the probability of grant amount type
k receipt compared with grant amount type k receipt (or propensity
score) conditional on a set of observables X using the following probit
model:
PTit kT Tit k, k FX. (3)
A k grant amount type plant j, which is closest in terms of its
propensity score to a k type grant amount plant i, is then selected as
a match for the latter using the caliper matching method.11 More
formally, for each grant type k receiving plant i, a grant type k plant
j is selected such that for the predicted probability, Pn, of receiving a
k type grant at time t of grant recipient plant i and the predicted
probability, Pjt, of receiving a k type grant at time t for k type grant
recipient plant j:
  Pit Pjt min
jk
Pit  Pjt, (4)
where  is a prespecified scalar that defines the boundary for the
neighborhood where matching is allowed. If none of the k grant type
recipients’ plants is within  of the k type recipient i, it is left
unmatched. This procedure is done for all (K  1) K type combina-
tions.
Despite its appeal in addressing the common support problem, the
PSM estimator still crucially rests on the conditional independence
assumption. In other words, in using the PSM it is pertinent that one
can convincingly argue that the data at hand is sufficiently rich for this
to be reasonable and/or that one supplements the PSM with another
estimator to overcome this strong assumption. We thus combine our
PSM matching procedure with a difference-in-differences (DID) es-
timator, which compares the change in the outcome variable for the k
treated groups with the change in the outcome variable for all non-k
type grant amount recipients, and thus can purge further time-
invariant effects from the specification. Accordingly, let Y k be the
difference in exporting before and after receiving a grant of amount k,
and difference this with respect to the before and after differences for
all comparison control groups, say Y kk. One then obtains the
difference-in-differences estimator   Y k  Y kk. In terms of
practical implementation this amounts to estimating
Yit   
1
k
Gitk  εit, (5)
where  is a time-differencing operator over t  1 to t, and Gk are a
k set of grant amount category dummies. Essentially this DID esti-
mator combined with PSM allows us to purge all time-invariant
unobservables from our relationship of interest in the matched sample.
However, even this combined estimation approach might leave one
with a potential problem of unobserved effects if these are time
varying. For example, firms may get a good idea, apply for a grant,
and also increase their exporting activity even in the absence of a
grant (e.g., Kauko, 1996, Jaffe, 2002). If this is the case for both
successful and nonsuccessful applicants, then this should not cause a
problem in our approach. If, however, this is more likely to be the case
for successful applicants, then our approach would likely overstate the
potential additionality of grant receipt. Unfortunately, we cannot
completely rule out this possibility, but instead need to make the
argument that our data are rich enough so that no other time-varying
unobservables that may be correlated with grant receipt and exporting
remain.
Finally, one must consider the appropriate nature of the dependent
variable Y. First, feasibly grant support may induce already exporting
plants to export more. Additionally, it may also be the case that the
loosening of financial constraints via subsidies could induce nonex-
porters to commence selling some of their output on the world market
(for example, Du & Girma, 2007, Greenaway, Guariglia, & Kneller,
2005). To deal with both of these aspects, we use alternatively two
dependent variables. The first one is the incidence of exporting—a
zero-one dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the plant is
exporting and 0 otherwise. The second is the log of total exports for
exporting incumbents.
V. Empirical Results
A. Propensity-Score Matching Results
Importantly, our information on grant receipt provides us with the
actual amount of each grant and thus allows us to examine the impact
11 The matching is performed in Stata version 8 using the software
provided by Sianesi (2001).
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS BY EXPORTING STATUS
TYPE: EXPORTER NONEXPORTER
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
WAGE 23.52 16.77 22.72 13.52
DOM. INPUTS 0.55 0.29 0.60 0.32
GRANT/SALES 18.34 383.77 6.76 52.24
RD INCIDENCE 0.379 — 0.341 —
EMPLOYMENT 95.00 208.51 60.46 133.76
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beyond grant receipt incidence. However, taking grant size into
account and using the propensity-score matching simultaneously nec-
essarily restricts us to grouping grant amounts into predefined cate-
gories. In this regard, the more categories we allow for, the less we are
assuming away within-heterogeneity in the sense that different grant
amounts within categories may have different impacts on exporting.
But, the greater the amount of categories one chooses, the more
infeasible in terms of our sample size and implementation will PSM
be, since K categories require the matching of (K  1) K different
combinations. Moreover, the choice of categories is to some extent
arbitrary unless one has clearly grounded a priori expectations of what
“threshold amounts” would be reasonable.
With these aspects in mind and after considerable experimentation,
we proceeded with using three different grant size categories, which
for the sake of convenience we termed small, medium, and large, and
defined respectively as the amounts that fall below the 33.3 percentile,
within the 33.3 to 66.6 percentile, and above the 66.6 percentile of the
entire distribution of subsidies over the full sample period. Therefore,
we are slicing the entire distribution of grants into three equally
probable groups. In terms of actual amounts, this corresponds to
categorizing grants less than 22,947 euros as small, between 22,947
and 87,769 euros as medium, and those above 87,769 euros as large
(all measured in 1998 prices).
In implementing PSM on our three grant categories, one would
ideally like to use a set of covariates X that capture, or are correlated
with, the factors that authorities may take into account when deciding
on handouts of grants as discussed above in section II. As noted, Irish
policymakers were keen on supporting firms that were export ori-
ented, entrepreneurial, technology intensive, skill intensive, linked to
the local economy, and likely to be financially constrained. In terms of
the information that our data sets provide, we identified the following
plant-level characteristics that may be important in this regard: size
(employment), domestic input use (domestically purchased interme-
diates over total intermediates), new product development (dummy
equals 1 if positive R&D expenditure), average wage, domestic
ownership, age, and a dummy for previous export activity. We use
lagged values of these variables to ensure that our covariates are
unaffected by grant receipt (or the anticipation of it); see Caliendo and
Kopeinig (2005). Finally, we also included a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the plant received a grant in the previous year in case
there are links in payments across years.
As a next step we calculated propensity scores and used the
matching estimator as previously outlined to create our control and
treatment groups.12 In doing so, from a total amount of 6,728 nonre-
cipient, 1,636 small-grant recipient, 1,639 medium-grant recipient,
and 1,727 large-grant recipient observations we were able to match
2,463, 1,549, 1,521, and 1,495 observations, respectively. We assess
the matching quality of this procedure using a variety of indicators
shown in table 2. For instance, as can be seen, the pseudo R-squared
of running the same probits with only the matched sample is multiple
times lower in all cases except where nongrant receipt is used as the
treatment group. We also, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985), calculated the standardized bias of the propensity scores for
our individual matching pairs as
SB  100
abs P1  P0
 0.5 V1P V0P
, (6)
where P is the propensity score, P represents its average, and V its
variance. One finds from the resulting figures in table 2 that the bias
reduction is considerable, ranging anywhere from 35% to 90%. Thus,
the matching quality indicators are clearly supportive of our underly-
ing matching procedure.
B. Econometric Results on the Treatment Effect
To estimate the effect of grant provision on exporting, we started
with the benchmark specification:
Yit  SSMALLit  MMEDIUMit LLARGEit εit, (7)
where SMALL, MEDIUM, and LARGE are zero-one type dummies
indicating whether a plant received a small, medium, or large subsidy,
and ε is a random-error term. The dependent variable is defined
alternatively as the log of total exports or incidence of exporting
(dummy  1 if plant exports).13
We first estimate equation (7) with the log level of exports as
dependent variable using the total sample (unmatched) with simple
OLS. This is thus the benchmark case of the effect of government
subsidies on exporting intensity of already exporting firms.14 The
12 We use a value of  equal to 0.1.
13 We use the logged value in order to take account of outliers. To avoid
the dropping of observations where exporting was zero, we set expendi-
ture in levels equal to one euro for these.
14 While we used the unmatched sample, one should note that we
reduced the data to include only observations for which we could also run
a first-differenced version of equation (7) in order to keep our sample size
consistent across unmatched estimation types.
TABLE 2.—INDICATORS OF MATCHING QUALITY
Treat. Control Sample
Treat.
Obs.
Control
Obs.
Pseudo R2
Before
Pseudo R2
After
BiasRed.
(%)
SMALL No Grant Total 1,229 997 0.146 0.013 0.914
MEDIUM No Grant Total 1,209 997 0.208 0.019 0.908
LARGE No Grant Total 1,247 997 0.267 0.028 0.896
SMALL MEDIUM Total 1,229 1,209 0.040 0.018 0.546
SMALL LARGE Total 1,229 1,247 0.111 0.042 0.622
MEDIUM LARGE Total 1,209 1,247 0.059 0.019 0.683
No Grant SMALL Total 997 1,229 0.146 0.096 0.341
No Grant MEDIUM Total 997 1,209 0.208 0.133 0.362
No Grant LARGE Total 997 1,247 0.267 0.162 0.394
MEDIUM SMALL Total 1,209 1,229 0.040 0.013 0.668
LARGE SMALL Total 1,247 1,229 0.111 0.027 0.759
LARGE MEDIUM Total 1,247 1,209 0.059 0.020 0.658
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resultant statistically significant coefficients, shown in the first row of
table 3, are negative for small grants but positive for medium and
large grants. This would, somewhat peculiarly, suggest that grants
seem to discourage exporting if they are small, but are effective in
promoting further exporting activity in firms if they are medium or
large.
Clearly, there are many other factors that affect both grant receipt
and the intensity of exporting among exporters, thus potentially
biasing our estimates. If these are assumed to be time invariant, then
they can be purged by simply first-differencing equation (7). Our
estimates from this exercise are shown in the second row of table 3.
As can be seen, this dramatically changes any conclusions drawn from
the coefficients obtained from our initial estimation. For the overall
sample one finds that there are now only significant effects for
large-grant recipients, thus indicating that perhaps a grant needs to be
large enough to further help a plant compete on the international
market.
We then proceed to investigating how government support may
affect the incidence of exporting (rows 3–4). Using a simple probit
model one finds that, regardless of size category, government subsi-
dies encourage plants to export in Irish manufacturing. Comparing the
size of the coefficients suggests, however, that while all sizes of grants
may have a positive effect on plants’ incidence of exporting, the larger
the grant the more likely a firm will export. Again we examined
whether time-invariant effects may be biasing our estimates by first-
differencing our data and then running OLS. However, we now find
no statistically significant evidence that grants encourage firms to
become exporters.
In order to assess whether our results may thus far have been driven
by the potential problem of common support, as discussed in section
IV, we then proceeded to use our matched sample to estimate a
first-differenced version of equation (7).15 One should note that this is
precisely the combined matching difference-in-difference estimator of
equation (5), and the estimated coefficients clearly indicate that
employing this can have substantial effects on any conclusions drawn.
More precisely, while still only large grants have a positive effect on
the export intensity of exporting plants, the magnitude of the coeffi-
cient is substantially lower than in the OLS estimation in row 1,
suggesting that not ensuring common support tends to overestimate
the effect in our case. In terms of export incidence we now find no
effect of government support, regardless of the size of the grant.
Clearly, thus, our results suggest that a multiple-treatment matching
framework can potentially avoid considerable bias due to sample
selection.
One possible concern with the matching estimator may be, given
that it is based on a multidimensionality of firm characteristics, that
our results are driven by the possibility that larger plants export more
and are also more likely to receive a grant. As a matter of fact, Bernard
and Jensen (2004) show that employment is an important determinant
of the propensity to export, while Barrios, Go¨rg, and Strobl (2003)
find a similar result in terms of the impact on export intensity.
Although our matching procedure is intended to create samples of
“similar” plants across all relevant characteristics—including size,
which we measure by employment—the use of the summary score in
the face of multidimensionality of characteristics may feasibly result
in less than perfect matching in this regard. To investigate this, we
therefore also include employment as an explanatory variable in our
regression. As can be seen, reassuringly the results remain the same.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We investigated the relationship between government support and
exporting activity. To this end, we used a uniquely rich data set on
Irish manufacturing plants and employed an empirical strategy that
combined a nonparametric matching procedure with a difference-in-
differences estimator in order to deal with the potential selection
problem inherent in such an analysis. Our results suggest that if grants
are large enough, they can encourage already exporting firms to
compete more effectively on the international market. However, there
is little evidence that grants encourage nonexporters to start exporting.
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DECOMPOSING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE U.S. COMPUTER INDUSTRY
Hyunbae Chun and M. Ishaq Nadiri*
Abstract—In this paper, we examine the sources of the productivity
growth in the U.S. computer industry from 1978 to 1999. We estimate a
joint production model of output quantity and quality that distinguishes
two types of technological changes: process and product innovations.
Based on the estimation results, we decompose total factor productivity
(TFP) growth rate into the contributions of process and product innova-
tions and scale economies. We find that product innovation associated
with better quality accounts for about 30% of the TFP growth in the
computer industry. Furthermore, the TFP acceleration in the computer
industry in the late 1990s is mainly derived from a rapid increase in
product innovation.
I. Introduction
DURING the last few decades, there has been a remarkableproductivity growth in the production of information technology
(IT) products such as computers, communications equipment, and
semiconductors. A typical measure of productivity is total factor
productivity (TFP), defined as the amount of output produced from
a given amount of input. Hence, the traditional TFP approach
mainly focuses on how much productivity growth is caused by the
improvement in the technological efficiency of production process
(process innovation).
In contrast to process innovation, productivity growth can take
place in the improvement of output quality (product innovation). In
particular, improvement in output quality, such as in microprocessor
speed and the capacity of storage devices and memory, is one of the
most prevailing characteristics in IT production. This suggests that
technological innovation associated with better quality can be an
important source of the TFP growth in the IT-producing industry. As
Hulten (2001) pointed out, however, the TFP approach is silent about
product innovation.1 Therefore, the identification of both process and
product innovations is crucial to the exploration of the sources of
productivity growth in the IT-producing industry.
In this paper, we examine the sources of the productivity growth in
the U.S. computer industry from 1978 to 1999. The novelty of this
paper is that we separate two different technical changes in TFP
growth: product innovation associated with better quality and process
innovation associated with more quantity. Using both the hedonic
(quality-adjusted) and list (quality-unadjusted) prices, we construct
the variables of output quantity and quality. Then, we formulate the
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1 Although some recent studies by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner
and Sichel (2000), and Whelan (2002) have attempted to measure the TFP
growth in the IT-producing industry, there have been few studies that
distinguish the contributions of process and product innovations in the
productivity growth in this industry.
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